Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 22

Issue 1

Article 3

1-1-2005

Skepticism and the Skeptical Theist
John Beaudoin

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Beaudoin, John (2005) "Skepticism and the Skeptical Theist," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society
of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 22 : Iss. 1 , Article 3.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200522136
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol22/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

SKEPTICISM AND THE SKEPTICAL THEIST
John Beaudoin

According to skeptical theists, our failure to find morally justifying goods for
certain of the world's evils fails to constitute even prima facie evidence that
these evils are genuinely gratuitous. For even if such reasons did exist, it is
not to be expected that our limited intellects would discover them. In this article I consider whether their skepticism about our ability to discover morally
justifying goods for various evils commits skeptical theists to more radical
fOnTIS of skepticism.

I.

Skeptical theists maintain the following thesis about human cognitive
access to possible moral goods (the formulation is Michael Bergmann's):
STl: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we
know of are representative of the possible goods there are.'
We can think of possible goods as possible states of affairs that have
positive moral value: states of affairs such as that in which human beings
cultivate loving relationships with one another, gain deeper understanding
of nature, or freely engage in acts of charity. Possible goods we know of are
possible goods that we find to obtain in this world, or that, at least, we can
imagine obtaining. The eradication of smallpox is a possible good in this
sense. So also is the condition in which human beings enjoy the beatific
vision in Heaven, since we can imagine the obtaining of such a good.
According to STl, it is a live possibility that the possible goods humans
know about are only a small, unrepresentative sample of all the possible
goods there are. To say that this is a live possibility is to say that it is true
for all we know: for all we know, we are poorly epistemically situated visa-vis the full range of possible goods. Put differently, we are in no good
position to know what is the objective probability that the possible goods
we know of are representative of the full range of possible goods.2
An evil is inscrutable if, even after thinking hard about it, we know of no
possible good which is such that obtaining that good, or making it possible
that it obtain, morally justifies God in permitting the evil. Put differently,
an evil is inscrutable if we know of no morally sufficient reason (MSR) for
God's permitting it. If in fact there is 110 MSR for an evil, known or not,
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then the evil is gratuitous. The suffering of children with cancer is an
inscrutable evil if we cannot imagine anything that would justify God's
permitting it; if in fact nothing could justify his permitting it, then this evil is
gratuitous. Theists are committed to believing that no actual evil is gratuitous in this sense.'
The following question has received considerable attention: is the
inscrutability of an evil a good reason to believe in its gratuitousness? That is, is
our failure to find any MSR for an evil good reason to believe that there in
fact is no reason that could justify God's permitting it? William Rowe has
argued that it is." Let us refer to any such inference - from the inscrutability
of an evil to its gratuitousness - a Rowean inference. One of Rowe's examples involves a fawn that dies slowly and painfully from bums incurred in
a forest fire ignited by lightning; call this evil E. The inference is:
P: No good we know of justifies God in permitting E.
Q: SO no good at all justifies God in permitting E.
And since God cannot co-exist with gratuitous evil, the inscrutability of
E is prima facie evidence of God's non-existence.
STl is supposed to block Rowean inferences like the one above by providing the Rowean with an undermining defeater for his belief in E's gratuitousness: the truth of STl would make P poor inductive support for Q.
The good that justifies God's permitting the fawn's suffering might simply
be beyond our ken, and so one calmot rationally accept ST1 and continue
to hold Q on the basis of P. In this way, the Rowean argument from evil is
defeated.
What some critics allege is that there is for skeptical theists a serious
downside to deploying STl against Rowe's evidential argument. The
claim, roughly, is that they thereby commit themselves to other, worse
forms of skepticism, such as skepticism about the past, about morality,
about certain theolOgical propositions, or about the reliability of their own
belief-forming mechanisms. After all, God might have some morally good
but inscrutable reason for actualizing any of various scenarios described by
skeptics. For all we know, by the skeptical theist's lights, God has some
good but inscrutable reason for engaging in massive deceptions on a level
with those perpetrated by Descartes's evil genius. I'll call this the Pandora's
Box (PB) objection to skeptical theism. My aim below will be to explicate
the various forms PB can take, and to consider whether any plausible
rejoinders are available to skeptical theists.
II.

Below is one formulation of PB. Let s be the state of affairs in which
God created an old-looking universe five minutes ago. Skeptical theists
allegedly are committed to all of the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)

God exists.
God has the power to actualize s.
For all we know, there is an MSR for God's actualizing s.
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From these it is supposed to follow that:
(4)

For all we know, God actualizes s; for all we know the universe is only five minutes old.

Thus, for example, Bruce Russell:
Is the view that there is a God who, for reasons beyond our ken,
allows the suffering which appears pointless to us any different epistemically from the view that there is a God who created the universe
[5 minutes] ago and, for reasons beyond our ken, has deceived us
into thinking it is older? It does not seem to be. .... [I]f it is not reasonable to believe that God deceived us, for some reason beyond our
ken, when he created the universe, it is not reasonable to believe that
there is some reason beyond our ken wruch, if God exists, would justify him in allowing all the suffering we see.5
Russell's phraSing is apt to mislead. It prompts Bergmann to give the
following characterization of PB:
The persuasive force of [PB] depends entirely on the false assumption
that it is excessively skeptical to have any serious doubts about whether
the goods we know of are representative of the goods there are.
Those proposing [PB] appeal to our reasonable disapproval of excessive skepticism and then try to get us to disapprove of STI on the
grounds that it involves excessive skepticism. But having doubts
about the representativeness of the goods we know of is not excessively skeptical. The possibility that the goods we know of aren't
representative of the goods there are is a live possibility, one that we
are sensible to consider and take seriously. It is not remote and farfetched in the way the Cartesian demon and the [5-minute]-0Id earth
possibilities are."
Let us be clear that it is not, or at least it need not, be any part of PB to
claim that skepticism about our access to possible goods is on a par with as 'excessive' as - skepticism about the past or about the reality of the external world. 7 Rather, the claim is that anyone who believes in a being who
has the power - and, for all we know, a morally sufficient reason - to
engage in large-scale deceptions should consider it a live possibility that
for some good but inscrutable reason this being is engaged in such a deception. If we are obligated to suspend judgment about whether there are
God-justifying reasons for all of the inscrutable evils we observe, then we
ought to suspend judgment as well on whether God actualizes s.
Bergmann is correct, nevertheless, when he claims that PB is a weak objection, at least as it stands. The problem with it is tills: it presupposes that the
basis on which any skeptical theist believes that God does not actualize s is a
Rowean inference, from 'I can't see what would justify God's actualizing 5' to
'probably there is no reason - probably God does not actualize 5.' This basis
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for believing that s does not obtain is unavailable to the skeptical theist; that
much is correct. But the point is that other, Rowean-inference-independent
(hereafter, 'RI-independent') reasons - perhaps the same ones atheists or nonskeptical theists have for believing in an old universe (whatever such reasons
might be) - might still be available to the skeptical theist. In other words, in
order that skeptical theists be committed to skepticism about the past, the following must be true: the only, or the principle basis they have for believing
that God does not actualize s is their failure to imagine any good reason that
would justify God's engaging in such a large-scale deception. Whether this is
true - whether skeptical theists are without any RI-independent reasons for
disbelieving in s - is not to the point here: the point is that a commitment to
STI does not by itself entail any commitment to skepticism about s.
Consider an analogy. Suppose I know nothing about Smith's honesty, or
lack thereof. For all I know, Smith is an inveterate liar. Now I claim to
believe something (P) Smith told me, but not on the basis of Smith's telling
me; instead, I've confirmed with my own eyes that P. Clearly in this case it
wouldn't do for someone to challenge the rationality of my belief by pointing out that for all I know Smith is a liar; my belief that P isn't based on
Smith's testimony.
In the same way, if a skeptical theist's only basis for believing in an old
universe is his belief in God's omnibenevolence (more specifically, in
God's unwillingness to engage in deceptions except when there is good
reason to do so), then he has a problem, since by his own lights God's
moral perfection is no guarantee against his permitting all sorts of
inscrutable evils. But, in principle at least, the skeptical theist might have
good independent reasons for believing in an old universe - some reason
not having to do with God's moral character. Perhaps there is some theologically neutral, telling philosophical argument for rejecting skepticism
about the past. If there is, then on this basis the skeptical theist can conclude that God has no MSR for actualizing s, since he has not actualized it.
But this knowledge won't have been arrived at by any Rowean inference.
So much for the initial formulation of PB. Formulations that substitute for
s skeptical scenarios involving (say) other minds or the external world can be
dealt with in similar fashion. This holds true even if the skeptical scenario
involves God's endowing us with a set of belief-forming mechanisms all of
which are unreliable. Any reasons available to non-theists for trusting in the
reliability of our belief-fonning mechanisms are ones of which skeptical theists can avail themselves, subject only to the following restriction: they must
be compatible with the latter's theological commitments and with any
account they provide about the possible causes of our (possibly) limited
moral visionY The suggestion, for example, that our cognitive deficiency in
this area is only one symptom of a more general cognitive defect that afflicts
post-Fall humanity runs the risk of w1dermining any attempt to marshal RIindependent grounds for rejecting the more radical forms of skepticism. 9

III.
Consider now a formulation of PB aimed at showing that at least skeptical theists cannot avoid an unpalatable theological skepticism. The skeptical
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theist allegedly is committed to all of the following, where r is the state of
affairs in which God provides us, through some mode of special revelation,
with false information about his eschatological plans for humanity:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)

God exists.
God has the power to actualize r.
For all we know, there is an MSR for God's actualizing r.
We have no good Rl-independent reasons for believing that
God does not actualize r.
So for all we know God actualizes r; for all we know God's
revelation is false and (hence) so are our beliefs about his
eschatological plans for humanity.

I rejected the previous versions of PB for the reason that skeptical theists
might have independent grounds on which to hold the target beliefs, such
as the belief in the reality of the external world; they need not arrive at
them by performing any Rowean inference - what STl prohibits. The proponent of PB, however, might suggest that at least in the present case no
such independent grounds are available: we only have God's revelation as a
source of information about his eschatological plans, and the reliability of
this source is what the present version of PB puts in doubt.1O
Return again to the case of Smith. Smith testifies to me that P, and now I
accept P on the basis of Smith's testimony; unlike in the previous case, I
don't have the testimony of my own eyes to the truth of what Smith told
me, or any other independent grounds for accepting P. If I now come to
believe that, for all I know, Smith is a liar, or at least that in these matters
he lies as often as he tells the truth, then I have an undermining defeater
for my belief that P. Allegedly, skeptical theists are in roughly the same
position in respect to their beliefs about God's plans, such as their belief
that some souls will be saved: God, for all we know, has some good but
inscrutable reason for deceiving us in such matters, and we have nothing
to go on here but God's own word.
Clearly the upshot of PB is that it would be irrational for skeptical theists
to hold the target beliefs about God's eschatological plans on the basis of
his revelation, in the same way that the Rowean would be irrational to
hold Q on the basis of P, if he also accepts STl. The implicit epistemic principle at work here appears to be roughly the following:
D: Suppose P's belief B is based on R.11 Now consider some proposition S which is such that if S is true, then R is no good basis on which
to believe B. If P believes that S is true for all P knows, then P cannot
rationally continue to hold B on the basis of R.
Confronted with the present version of PB it would be tempting, perhaps, for the skeptical theist to reject principle D and to replace it with
some principle about defeaters that enables him to avoid the charge of irrationality.12 But going this route involves some risk. Suppose, for example,
that 0 is replaced with the following principle:
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D': Suppose P's belief B is based on R. Now consider some proposition S which is such that if S is true, then R is no good basis on which
to believe B. If P believes that probably S is true, then P cannot rationally continue to hold B on the basis of R.
According to D' the inscrutable probability of S would be insufficient to
make it a successful undermining defeater: it must be that P believes S
probably is true - more likely true than not. That would avoid the problem
raised by the present version of PB since, plausibly enough, it was not
claimed that probably God has a good reason for providing us with a false
revelation. But it comes at the cost of rendering ST1 innocuous against the
Rowean argument from evil, since STl does not allege that probably the
possible goods we know of are unrepresentative of the total range of possible goods there are; STl only states (to paraphrase) that for all we know they
are unrepresentativeY Skeptical theists who want to retain the ability to
block Rowe's crucial inference cannot avoid PB by using D'.
Similarly risky would be the suggestion that r represents a state of
affairs so intrinsically evil that no omnibenevolent being, in any recognizable sense of the term benevolent, could permit its actualization, and that on
this basis skeptical theists can avoid PB by rejecting (3t above. The claim,
based perhaps on a moral intuition, would be that there could not be an
MSR for God's actualizing f. The problem is that there's not much to recommend the view that f is a worse state of affairs than any of the evils we
observe in this world, the permission of which is, according to theists, compatible with God's impeccable moral character. At the very least, the skeptical theist who goes this route must concede that our intuitions about
what is morally justifiable sub specie crternitatis are, at least in some extreme
cases, reliable. And this opens the door again to evidential arguments
from evil that proceed from actual evils comparable to or (I would estimate) far worse than r.
What other recourse is there for skeptical theists, if any? 1 outline two
alternatives below.
(1) Reject (4), above, by reasoning inductively from the truth of God's independently checkable revelations. Some of what God tells us might be independently verifiable, either by empirical scientists (e.g. archaeologists), or by
philosophersY If in these revelations God has a track-record of honesty,
then we might reason inductively to the truth of what he tells us regarding
matters not independently checkable. It is, after all, commonplace to reason thus in regard to other humans.
But there are two major worries here. The first is that in order for this suggestion to work, it must be practically feasible to check out God's other revelations - if not all of them then at least a large enough number of them to
establish a solid track record of honesty. The practical barriers to this are,
however, considerable, beginning with the difficulties in determining
whether a given revelation is one genuinely from God, and including also the
problem of being able to interpret the revelations accurately and specifically
enough that we know what would constitute confirming evidence for them.
But perhaps the more compelling worry here is the traditional one
about tying one's faith in God or his revelation to the results of empirical
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investigations by historians and scientists: if a skeptical theist's confidence
in the truth of God's uncheckable revelations must rise and fall with the
vicissitudes of historical scholarship, for example, then he is likely to find
himself always vacillating between belief and unbelief.
(2) Give a circular justification for judging it improbable that God actualizes r.
Assume that the proposition that God deceives us for some good reason is
improbable relative to what we learn by divine revelation (imagine God
begins every revelation with 'Truly I say unto you .... '). To claim on this
basis that it is not true for all we know that God's revelation is false would
of course involve us in circularity: using revelation's outputs to justify
belief in its reliability. But as many are quick to point out, the same circularity infects any attempt to show the reliability of more mundane beliefsources such as sense-perception by using their outputs. If in the latter
case the circularity involved is unobjectionable, then why not in the former
case? Of course the analogy with sense perception is much too facile as it
stands. The issue is whether revelation in its various modes constitutes
what William Alston calls a doxastic practice roughly on a par with sense
perception in its epistemic credentials - e.g. in the degree to which it is selfsupporting, and in the sophistication of its defeater system.
Alternative (2) seems to me the only recourse for skeptical theists that
holds out much hope of obviating the present form of PB. The literature on
the topic - especially on Alston's recent work on it - is already considerable,
however, and too complex to get into here. IS
What can be said is that, absent a compelling argument for the unlikelihood of anyone's making good on the suggested analogy between special
revelation and more mundane belief-sources, that theological skepticism is
unavoidable by skeptical theists because RI-independent grounds for rational
belief in God's revelation are unavailable, has not conclusively been shown. 16 Of
course, other means by which to link skeptical theism with a broad theological skepticism might exist, but none, so far as I know, has been suggested.
IV.

I look now at two more forms that PB can take. According to the first,
STl prohibits skeptical theists from using inverse-probability arguments in
natural theology. According to the second, the moral skepticism explicit in
STl and in other skeptical theses to be listed below is, from the standpoint
of moral praxis, crippling or at least degrading. I'll have comparatively
more to say about the second challenge.
The central idea behind the use of inverse-probability in natural theology is that God's existence probabilifies, to varying degrees (which might be
expressed only comparatively), certain of the empirical observations we
make. In some cases it is claimed that if God exists then the observed phenomena are rather to be expected, and that this is so because of what we
know about God's nature - in particular, that he is omnibenevolent - and
about value. Here is an example from Richard Swinburne:
Does a God have reason for making a world in which men have
responsibility for the well-being of each other? Fairly evidently, to
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some extent yes. A world in which good things can only be attained
by co-operation is one which a God has reason to make - for benefiting each other is a good thing ..... A good God, like a good father, will
delegate responsibility. In order to allow creatures a share in creation,
he will allow them the choice of hurting and maiming, of frustrating
the divine plan. Our world is of course one where creatures have just
such deep responsibility for each other.l7
The crucial point is that this type of argument centrally involves making
claims about what sorts of things we are likely to find in a world created and superintended by God. Swinburne expresses some diffidence about our ability to
make such judgments, given our human limitations, but on the whole he
finds no prohibitive implausibility in our doing SO.18
But anyone who embraces STl will find it too implausible to claim that
we know (on grounds independent of any revelation from the being whose
existence is to be shown), even to a good approximation, what to expect to
find in a world God creates. 19 That's exactly why finding massive amounts
of evil in the world does not, on the skeptic's view, tend to disconfirm
God's existence. For all we know, the achieving of some great good
requires that God permit so much evil. Similarly, for all we know, there is
some great good the obtaining of which requires that God not create a
world in which creatures are significantly responsible for one another's
well-being. And so the assignments of conditional probability - even comparative ones - cannot be made here, and natural theological arguments by
inverse-probability cannot get off the ground.
This version of PB is, I believe, correct, so long as it isn't simply built
into the theistic hypothesis that God wants to create a world with the features we find this one to have. Swinburne, for methodological reasons20,
makes conditional assignments of probability on the more austere hypothesis that God exists - i.e. that there is a disembodied spirit who is
omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, necessary, and perfectly
good. Given only the austere hypothesis, and given the live possibility that
God, for some inscrutable good reason, would refrain from creating a
world with the features we find this one to have, the evidence in question
has inscrutable probability on the hypothesis, and the inverse-probability
arguments cannot be formulated. Whether this represents a serious problem for skeptical theists depends entirely on how much importance, if any,
they assign to being able to prove God's existence, either at all or by this
particular method, and opinions on these matters are likely to differ from
one skeptical theist to another.21
The final version of PB to be looked at here involves the claim that the
moral skepticism explicit in STl and in several other skeptical theses listed
below commits skeptical theists to a practically incapacitating skepticism
about our ability to make moral judgments even in mundane contexts. The
other skeptical theses are below (ST2 and ST3 are given by Bergmann):
ST2: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we
know of are representative of the possible evils there are.
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ST3: We have no good reason for tlunking that the entailment relations we know of between possible goods and the permission of possible evils are representative of the entailment relations there are
between possible goods and the permission of possible evils.
ST4: We have no good reason for tltinking that the total moral value
or disvalue we perceive in certain complex states of affairs accurately
reflects the total moral value or disvalue they really have.

A particular skeptical theist might reject one or more of STl-4, but for simplicity let's assume that skeptical theists embrace all four theses. ST2 is a natural corollary of STl, and it is equally relevant to countering inductive arguments from evil, since the reason for which God prevents some inscrutable
evil might be in order to avoid some worse evil that is beyond our ken.
The idea behind ST3 is that there might be unsuspected connections physical, metaphysical, or logical - between certain goods and certain evils.
Suppose that we know of a certain possible good G which is such that if the
only way to get G were to permit some evil E, then G would justify God's
permitting E. Suppose the problem (in respect to its usefulness to theodicists) with G is that, to all appearances, E simply is not a necessary precondition for obtaining tltis good; it seems to us that God could get G by other
means much less costly in human suffering. What ST3 alleges is that
humans really are in no good position to make the following inference:
1.

2.

So far as we know E is not a necessary condition for God's
bringing about G.
So E is not a necessary condition for God's bringing about G.

The skepticism at issue here is not specifically moral, but it is relevant in
an obvious way to our ability to make claims about the existence of Godjustifying moral reasons for various evils.
Daniel Howard-Snyder provides an expression of ST4:
[W]hy can a child discern the literary merits of a comic book but not
Henry V? .... Why can a child recognize the value of his friendship
with his buddy next door but not the full value of his parents' love
for each other? Surely because Henry V .... and adult love involve
much more than he is able to comprehend. And tltis is true of adults
as well, as reflection on our progress in understanding the complexity of various things of value reveals. For example, periodically
reflecting on the fabric of our relationships .... we might well find
strands and shades that when brought to full light permit us to see
love as more valuable than we had once thought. 22
The idea here is not that our estimates of the total moral value in some
state of affairs might be wrong because there are unknown goods or evils
causally or logically connected with this one (STl & ST2), or known goods
or evils connected with it in unknown ways (ST3). Rather, it is that we can
be wrong, perhaps radically, about the intrinsic value of tltings apart from
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their connections with other states of affairs. We might know, for example,
that free will is good, but fail to realize just ]IOW good it is, in itself. So even
if, for example, the value of our being free does not seem great enough to
justify God in permitting moral evils like the Holocaust, that is no good
reason to suppose it is not in fact good enough.
As with SIl, my interest in ST2-4 is not in their truth or falsity, but in
whether commitment to them really has the unpalatable consequences that
critics have alleged (of course, if they do, then depending on what those
consequences are, they might bear on the truth or falsity of the theses that
entail them). Of the import skeptical theism has for our ability to make
moral judgments even in the most quotidian contexts, Evan Fales says:
In matters of morals, we seek to know what the total good and evil
associated with contemplated states of affairs are, for it is this which
determines whether those states are to be desired, and whether we
should seek to bring them about. But if our knowledge of the moral
value of these states of affairs is as radically defective as the [skeptical] theist has to claim - states of affairs which are not only common
but often within our power to produce or prevent - then we have
indeed lost our grip upon the possibility of using moral judgments as
a guide for action and evaluation. 23
Part of what makes it difficult to determine the implications of the skeptical theses for our ability to act morally and to make moral judgments
about the actions of others is that skeptical theists might hold widely divergent views about the nature of moral decision-making and evaluation, and
the import of SIl-4, or of some subset of these, might be different depending on the details. We can, however, make a few general observations.
(1) The truth of the skeptical theses would indeed, as Fales contends,
preclude our knowing, at least on our own, the total intrinsic and instrumental value of states of affairs we might contemplate in our moral deliberations. That we would like to know the total value is no doubt true as
well. That we need to know it in order that we be capable of acting as
responsible moral agents is less obvious, which leads us to the next point.
(2) Skeptical theism raises no barriers to agent evaluation, if this only
requires us to determine whether it was the intention of the agent to do
the right thing. Judgments about praiseworthiness and blameworthiness
can still be made even if, for all we know, an apparently evil action has
unknown good consequences, and vice-versa. Of course this is not
enough fully to escape the charge that skeptical theists will be morally
crippled by their skepticism: it remains to be shown that we can confidently make moral choices, and this involves the evaluation of alternative courses of action.
(3) When it comes to evaluating actions we might just interest ourselves
in what seems right and wrong relative merely to our (possibly) limited
information, but then we must concede that, for all we can tell, our moral
judgments might be wildly off the mark. Alternatively, we can prevail
upon God simply to tell us what is right, and follow his commands regardless of whether we are able to comprehend the moral reasoning behind
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them. Fales attributes a version of the latter view to Marilyn McCord
Adams: it is only for us to follow the rules God hands down to us. What
chiefly (though not solely24) worries Fales is the degradation of our status
as moral agents the view seems to involve.
God's commands could take the form of strictly prescribing or enjoining certain actions, regardless of the consequences foreseeable by us.
But if they were of this form, our moral freedom (beyond decisions as
to how to apply the Law in particular circumstances) would consist
of nothing more than the ability to choose whether to obey or not.
Deliberation with a view to the consequences of action would be
morally irrelevant. But such a limited form of moral responsibility as
this would hardly suit the "station" of an intelligent dog, let alone
agents such as ourselves.25
It is less easy here than in previous cases to determine whether skeptical
theism has the bad consequences imputed to it: what is degrading is, after
all, largely a matter of personal taste. I leave it to the reader to consider
whether the present view puts us in an abject condition qua moral agents.
If it does, and if it is any part of theism to attribute to human moral agents
the sort of responsibility for their actions that requires of them more than
what we can do on Adams's view, then the skeptical theist confronts a
problem of internal inconsistency at worst; at least, he must accept that his
condition as a moral agent is low. If it is believed that skeptical theism does
not have this consequence, then Adams's view represents for skeptical theists at least one way in which to obviate the present version of PB.
Other moral theories mayor may not be ones to which skeptical theists
can subscribe consistent with their skeptical commitments; they have to be
considered case by case. And there might be other ways in which to argue
that skeptical theists are committed to some form of moral skepticism.
Brice Wachterhauser, for example, claims that certain of the world's more
heinous evils are test-cases in the sense that any point of view that does not
recognize them as gratuitous cannot plausibly be considered a moral point
of view at all. After describing some of these evils, Wachterhauser says:

These are "limit cases" for moral theory such that any moral theory
can be tested by its ability to give a convincing account of why such
evils are morally unjustifiable. Any moral theory which cannot give
such an account can quite plausibly be dismissed and any theory
which claims that such evils are only apparently unjustifiable strains
our moral credulity beyond its possible limits. If we can know anything at all about the nature of unjustifiable evil it must be based
upon such cases or the very project of moral understanding must be
hopeless from the start. .... [W]e cannot appeal to the difference
between divine and human knowledge in order to understand God's
response (or lack thereof) because there are no principles that could
possibly justify the existence of such an evil. 26
This is not uniquely a problem for skeptical theists: it is supposed to
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be a problem for any theist who believes that no actual evil is gratuitous. But skeptical theists doubtless will find Wachterhauser's remarks
in the quoted passage - especially the last statement - merely questionbegging.

v.
What Rowe finds especially objectionable about skeptical theism is that
it appears to have the consequence that no amount of evil in the world can
constitute even prima facie evidence of God's non-existence.
For, to repeat their constant refrain, since we don't know that the
goods we know of are representative of the goods there are, we cannot know that it is even likely that there are no goods that justify God
in permitting whatever amount of apparently pointless, horrific evil
there might occur in our world. Indeed, if human life were nothing
more than a series of agonizing moments from birth to death, their position
would still require them to say that we cannot reasonably infer that it
is even likely that God does not exist. But surely such a view is
unreasonable, if not absurd. 27
It follows that we have a good reason to reject the skeptical theses that
entail this absurd consequence.
Note, incidentally, that what Rowe says does not entail that skeptical
theists could not rationally believe that the evils in the envisioned world
are gratuitous - only that this could not be inferred - consistent with STl4 - from their inability to imagine any MSR for God's actualizing such a
world. Possibly there are non-inferential grounds on which to believe in
the gratuitousness of these evils. The issue then comes down to
whether, according to one's broader epistemology, it is rational to
believe in this way in the gratuitousness of the evils, while also upholding the skeptical theses. At the least, this view would require rejecting
principle D, above. And it might open the door to a different form of the
evidential argument from evil: one that does not require the atheologian
to reject any of STl-4.28
Suppose that the skeptical theses do have the implication Rowe mentions: that no amount or variety of evil whatsoever could constitute (for us)
evidence of God's non-existence. Then skeptical theists must choose
between biting the bullet and accepting the consequence despite its (at
least) superficial implausibility, or they must attenuate somewhat their
skepticism and claim that some evils are bad enough that if there were a
good reason for God's permitting them, probably we would know about it.
They then would have to claim that none of the evils we find in this world
are this bad. The obvious drawback is that, now, Rowean arguments from
evil are no longer out of order.
Of course, if there is independent and overwhelmingly good reason to
believe that the skeptical theses, or anyone of them (anyone by itself
appears sufficient to block Rowean inferences, though for convenience I
have focused mainly on STl), are true, then we simply are forced to accept
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even their less palatable implications. My aim here has been to show that
these implications are less grave than some have claimed.

Northern Illinois University
NOTES
1. "Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument from EviL"
Nous 35 (2001), p.279. Bergmann builds into skeptical theism two other claims,
ST2 and ST3, that will be discussed in the penultimate section.
2. For reasons that I have already been mentioned elsewhere (see the article in note 16), it cannot plausibly be maintained that probably the goods we
know of are an unrepresentative sample of the full range of goods. Fortunately
for skeptical theists, only the weaker claim - that for all we know the sample of
goods we know of is unrepresentative of the full range - is needed for the
defensive purpose to which they put ST1.
3. But see William Hasker, "The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil," Faith and
Philosophy 9 (1992), pp.23-44. Can a theist believe that some merely possible evils
are gratuitous? That depends: if God exists necessarily, and if he is essentially
omnibenevolent, then in no possible world is there a gratuitous evil - i.e. in no possible world is there an evil so bad that nothing could justify God's permitting
it. See the discussion by Richard Gale in his On the Nature and Existence of God
(Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.229.
4. See his "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American
Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979), pp.335-41; "Evil and Theodicy," Philosophical
Topics 16 (1988), pp.119-32.
It should be noted that Rowe has since revised his argument. See "The
Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look," in Daniel Howard-Snyder
(ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil (Indiana University Press, 1996),
Chap.14.
5. "Defenseless," in Howard-Snyder, p.197. See also, in the same volume,
Richard Gale, "Some Difficulties in Theistic Treatments of Evil," pp.20S-9.
6. "Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument from Evil,"
pp.290-1.
7. Even if they were on a par, this wouldn't commit the skeptical theist to
holding the other forms of skepticism. Skepticism about other minds might be
as offensive to common sense as skepticism about the past, but neither entails
the other.
S. Ophthalmologists can provide an account of near-sightedness in terms
of the shape of the eye and the focusing of light. Part of any full defense of STl
should be an account of just how moral vision might be impaired: it is not
obvious, after all, just how so many goods might escape us. Is it that we have
some special faculty for finding moral goods, and this faculty is not working
properly? How does it get impaired? Is the condition inherited? Is it remediable by any means available to us and apart from God's help?
9. For more on this, see Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belicf(Oxford
University Press, 2000), Chapters 7 & S.
10. One can substitute for r any other state of affairs in which God reveals
to us false information on matters to which we have no epistemic access except
by God's revelation: e.g. information about God's own nature not provable by
any form of natural theology, or revelations about history that are for one reason or another not independently checkable by historians.
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11. R can be another belief, or some experience. In the latter case, B can be
inferred from R, or formed on the basis of R in the so-called "basic" way, as
when I immediately (i.e. non-inferentially) form the belief that there is a horse
in front of me on the basis of a certain visual experience.
12. For some in-depth discussion of the concept of undermining defeaters,
see the discussions of Plantinga's argument against naturalism in James Beilby
(ed.) Naturalism Defeated? (Cornell University Press, 2002), esp. Parts II & IV.
13. This suggests that skeptical theists might simply modify STl and argue
for the stronger claim that probably the possible goods we know of are unrepresentative of the full range. But see note #2.
14. Ignore here any questions about why God would reveal something we
can find out for ourselves; perhaps it is for the very reason I'm discussing.
15. See Alston's Perceiving God (Cornell University Press, 1992). For more
on epistemic circularity, see Ernest Sosa's "Philosophical Skepticism and
Epistemic Circularity" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supp.vo1.68 (1994),
pp.263-90.
16. This conclusion is much weaker than the one I defended in a previous
article. The present article is aimed in part at correcting that earlier error. See
my "Inscrutable Evil and Skepticism," Heythrop /ournal41 (2000), pp.297-302.
17. Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Clarendon Press, 1991),
pp.187;189. See the first several chapters in The Existence of God for details on
the Bayesian approach Swinburne uses. It is worth noting that in some cases it
is claimed, consistent with STl, only that, relative to the proposition that God
exists, the observations are as likely as not, while on any rival hypothesis
according to which there is no God, the observations are downright unlikely.
In this case, the theistic 'hypothesis' is differentially confirmed over its rivals
though it is not claimed that God's existence makes the observations in question more likely than not. Whether this formulation of the argument is viable
depends on whether we can equate 'the observations are as likely as not if God
exists' with 'the objective probability of the observations is.5 if God exists'.

18. The Existence ofGod,pp.llO-11.
19. That is, aside from trivial things such as 'things that owe their existence
to God', or 'things that are not gratuitous evils'.
20. Building more into a hypothesis tends to complexify it and consequently to drop its prior probability - one of the key factors in the Bayesian formula
Swinburne uses to represent the evidential import of the evidence he considers. For more on the implications of skeptical theism for natural theology, see
my "Evil, the Human Cognitive Condition, and Natural Theology," Religious
Studies 34 (1998), pp.403-18.
21. Cf. the remarks on this version of PB in Paul Draper, "The Skeptical
Theist," in Howard-Snyder, p.188; and Richard Gale, op.cit., pp.208-9.
22. "The Argument from Inscrutable Evil," in Howard-Snyder, pp.302-3.
Cf. William Alston on p.323 of the same volume: "[A] good's being "known"
does not necessarily put us in a favorable position to assess its magnitude and
hence does not necessarily put us in a favorable position to say whether its
obtaining would justify God's permitting a certain evil..." ("Some
(Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil").
23. Evan Fales, "Should God not have Created Adam?," Faith and
Philosophy 9 (1992), pp.l92-208.
24. There are likely to be problems associated with our ability correctly to
interpret and apply God's commands, for example, and with the authenticity
of the revelations in which they are couched.
25. "Should God not have Created Adam?," p.204.
26. "The Problem of Evil and Moral Skepticism," International Journal for the
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Philosophy of Religion 17 (1985), pp.172;173.
27. "Skeptical Theism: A Response to Bergmann," Nous 35 (2001), p.298.
28. For more on non-propositional reasons for believing in the gratuitousness of certain evils, see Jerome Gellmann, "A New Look at the Problem of
Evil," Faith and Philosophy 9 (1992), pp.209-15.

